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Abstract 
 
This project treats the controversies surrounding Turkey’s possible EU membership 
and is explored according to the problem formulation  
“How does the Cyprus conflict influence Turkey’s prospect of becoming a member of 
the EU?”  
This will be examined according to the grand theory of Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism as formulated by Andrew Moravcsik and Frank 
Schimmelfennig, and the analytical framework of Two-Level Game as formulated by 
Robert D. Putnam.  
 
The project has its onset in Turkey’s accession process to the EU, starting with their 
bid for membership of the European Economic Community in 1959 leading up to the 
current status of negotiations. This negotiations have since 2006 been gridlocked 
after 18 chapters in the negotiations were blocked. We will present the argument 
that the main reason for this blockade is Turkey’s refusal to apply the Additional 
Protocol of the Ankara Agreement to the Republic of Cyprus.  
The reasons for the long accession process and the block of accession chapters will 
be sought to be explained by defining the state preferences regarding Turkey’s 
accession and the conflict of Cyprus, of the member states, who has been the most 
outspoken in regards to Turkey’s possible membership; The United Kingdom, 
France, Germany, Austria, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus.  
The defined state preferences will be utilized in order to answer to what extend the 
political game regarding the negotiations of Turkey’s accession, is primarily 
influenced by member state preferences or if a common EU preference is at play.  
 
The project concludes that the problematic surrounding the Cyprus conflict is not 
directly the cause of the prolonged accession of Turkey, but is rather used in a 
political game as an excuse for preventing Turkey becoming a member or to hold 
them check.  
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AKP - Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, in English Justice and Development Party  
ECJ - European Court of Justice 
EEC - European Economic Community 
EU - European Union 
IR - International Relations 
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RC - Republic of Cyprus 
TGNA - Turkish Grand National Assembly  
TLG - Two-Level Game 
TRNC - Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
UN - United Nations 
 
  
5 
 
Table of Contents 
1. Problem Area .................................................................................................................. 7 
2. Theory ........................................................................................................................... 11 
2.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism ................................................................................. 11 
2.1.1 State Preferences .............................................................................................. 12 
2.1.2 Drivers and Brakemen ..................................................................................... 14 
2.1.3 Power distribution ............................................................................................ 15 
2.2 Two-Level Game Theory ........................................................................................ 16 
2.2.1 Win-sets ........................................................................................................... 17 
2.2.2 Bargaining power of negotiators ...................................................................... 21 
2.2.3 The myth of the neutral broker ........................................................................ 22 
2.3 Critique of theory .................................................................................................... 22 
3. Methodology ................................................................................................................. 23 
3.1 Research Design ...................................................................................................... 24 
3.2 Choice of theory ...................................................................................................... 25 
3.3 Conceptualization ................................................................................................... 26 
3.4 Operationalization ................................................................................................... 27 
3.4.1 State preferences .............................................................................................. 27 
3.4.2 Drivers and Brakemen ..................................................................................... 27 
3.4.3 Win-sets ........................................................................................................... 28 
3.4.4 Bargaining power of negotiators ...................................................................... 28 
3.5 Empirical Research Field ........................................................................................ 29 
4. Contextualisation .......................................................................................................... 30 
4.1 The EU enlargement: A Historical Perspective ...................................................... 30 
4.1.1 The accession process ...................................................................................... 31 
6 
 
4.2 The Cyprus conflict ................................................................................................. 33 
4.3 Turkey and EU membership ................................................................................... 35 
4.3.1 A brief history of Turkey ................................................................................. 35 
4.3.2 Form of government ........................................................................................ 35 
5. Analysis ......................................................................................................................... 37 
5.1 Turkey and the EU .................................................................................................. 37 
5.1.1 Turkey’s preferences towards the EU .............................................................. 37 
5.1.2 Turkey’s role as candidate country .................................................................. 38 
5.2 State preferences ..................................................................................................... 42 
5.2.1 Brakemen ......................................................................................................... 42 
5.2.2 Drivers .............................................................................................................. 49 
5.3 The EU preference towards a Turkish membership ............................................... 53 
5.4 Two-level game Analysis - the state of the negotiations between Turkey and the 
EU ................................................................................................................................. 55 
5.4.1 The EU Win-set ............................................................................................... 55 
5.4.2 The Turkish Win-set ........................................................................................ 56 
5.4.3 Powers and positions of the negotiators ........................................................... 58 
5.4.4 Rhetorical Entrapment ..................................................................................... 58 
5.4.5 EU reluctance towards solving the Cyprus conflict ......................................... 60 
6. Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 61 
7. Afterthoughts ................................................................................................................ 64 
8. Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 66 
 
 
  
7 
 
1. Problem Area 
 
The history of Turkey and the European Union is long and difficult. For more than 
fifty years, Turkey and the institution of EU has been engaged in a political struggle 
regarding the question of how, when and if to accept Turkey as a member of; first 
the European Economic Community (EEC) and now the EU. The interests and 
demands have shifted between the two both externally and internally. Today, more 
than fifty years since the struggle began, and more than 25 years since Turkey 
applied for full membership, Turkey is still a candidate country and it is the country 
with the longest accession process to date.  
 
During the last decade Turkey has carried out extensive reforms in order to fulfil the 
EU accession criteria. However, further reforms are required if Turkey are to have a 
real chance at future membership. With decreasing domestic support for the pro- 
EU strategy, that the Turkish government is pursuing, and new demands from the 
EU still being made, the future might result in widespread Euroscepticism in the 
Turkish public - a tendency which is already emerging sporadically (LaGro & 
Jørgensen 2007: 2).  
 
For Turkey, the accession into EU is a natural step as it is already engagement in 
other international organisations like the OECD and NATO (MFA Turkey 2013). 
Further, Turkey finds EU membership a natural goal, as a result of their cooperation 
with EU in many policy areas and the extensive democratic transformation of 
Turkey (MFA Turkey 2013). 
From an EU perspective acceding Turkey as a member could strengthen EU as a 
player in world affairs. Furthermore it could have a positive spill over effect on 
peace and democracy to a large part of the world and widening the single market. 
(Dervis 2013: 24) 
 
There is however several issues regarding Turkey’s accession that plays a role in 
stalling the process; some member states has blocked the accession process and 
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since the accession process is based on unanimity it only takes one uncooperative 
member state to stop the entire process. The arguments for blocking Turkey’s 
accession process has been varying; that it is not solely a geographical part of 
Europe and that the mainly Islamic population of the country will be too cultural 
diverse to fit in. However the most outspoken issue that is a hindrance to Turkey’s 
accession, and which is used as the official explanation to Turkey’s slow accession 
process, is the conflict of Cyprus.  
 
In 1974 Turkey invaded 37 per cent of Cyprus and declared the occupied area to be 
the Turkish Federal State of Cyprus (Hughes 2011: 90-94). This happened after a 
long period of ethnic dispute between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots of Cyprus.  
The Turkish government's decision to deploy troops to Cyprus was ultimately a 
result of both an increase in ethnic brutality and the Cypriot government being 
overturned by Greek officers in 1974 (Çakir 2011: 33). 
Ever since then the island has been divided into two, with the Turkish Cypriots 
occupying the north and the Greek Cypriots occupying the rest. 
Attempts to solve the Cyprus conflict has since then been numerous, most notable 
was the Annan plan proposed by the United Nations, named after Kofi Annan - 
former Secretary General of the UN, in 2002, two years before the Republic of 
Cyprus (RC) acceded to the EU. The sum of the Annan plan was to reunify the island, 
which would have enabled Cyprus to accede to the EU as one unified nation (Ibid: 
36). 
The Annan plan was called to referendum in Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots declined 
whereas the Turkish Cypriots accepted. The Annan Plan failed, and the RC is now a 
member of the EU and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is not 
(Ibid.). 
Cyprus became a member state during the enlargements of 2004. Membership has 
given the RC the means to veto Turkish accession, which the RC has hinted at 
several times. The scope of this project is to investigate Turkey’s struggles of 
accession in the EU with focus on which effect the lasting conflict with the RC has on 
the on-going negotiations. 
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Hypothesis 
 
Cyprus is a hindrance to Turkey becoming a member of the European Union.  
 
Problem formulation 
 
How does the Cyprus conflict influence Turkey’s prospect of becoming a member 
of the EU? 
 
Working questions 
In order to answer this question, further subsequent questions must first be 
answered: 
 
1: What is Turkey’s preferences regarding EU membership?  
 
This working question will enable us to define Turkey’s state preferences, and to 
account for the current state of affairs as well as what Turkey is actively doing to 
obtain membership. This will include an account of Turkey's relationship with the 
RC and their role in the Cyprus conflict. Working question 1 will further be 
answered by explaining why Turkey is interested in becoming a member of the EU 
and what may argue against a membership.  
 
2: What are the selected member states’ preferences concerning the accession of  
Turkey and the Cyprus conflict? 
 
Working question 2 will render possible a mapping of the differences in attitude 
among the member states towards Turkey’s possible accession. We will thereby be 
able to depict the general attitude towards Turkey’s possible membership and 
towards the Cyprus conflict, and account for the reasons behind the different 
attitudes.  
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3: Who of the selected member states are Brakemen and who are Drivers? How and  
why do they pursue this role? 
 
To get a more comprehensive understanding of how the member states act in the 
accession negotiation, getting an understanding of the distribution of roles and how 
these are pursued is essential. Working question 3 will in that manner be a 
continuation of question 2.  
 
4: What are the size and overlap of the negotiators win-sets? 
 
In this question we will investigate the win-sets of EU and Turkey respectively to 
see the overlap or the lack of such and how the state preferences and the Cyprus 
conflict might have a possible influence on this.  
 
5: Why is EU reluctant to solve the Cyprus conflict? 
 
In this question we will answer why EU has not done more in regards to solving the 
Cyprus conflict and how this might influence the prospect of Turkish membership.  
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2. Theory 
 
As a tool for answering our problem formulation we will draw on the grand theory 
of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) and the closely connected Two-level game 
(TLG) theory. We combine the two as we have found that Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism can give us a broad overview of the mechanisms that drives 
nation states in international arenas. Two-level game then provides the framework 
for understanding the mechanics of the bargaining environment in which Turkey, 
the EU and the braking and driving factors try and influence the outcome of the 
association process. 
2.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
LI is a grand theory that attempts to explain the ties between states in an 
intergovernmental framework, such as the EU. LI is derived from intergovernmental 
institutionalism and liberal theories of national preferences (Moravcsik 1993: 480). 
The instigating author of LI is professor of Politics and International Affairs, Andrew 
Moravcsik. 
LI draws on the thoughts of traditional intergovernmentalists such as Hoffman, 
though focusing more on the motivation of states to interact and bargain with other 
states within an intergovernmental framework (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig 2009: 
68). Moravcsik highlights the state as being a rational actor, as they will always seek 
to adopt the alternative which gives the highest positive return. The establishment 
of international institutions or interstate cooperation in general is then the outcome 
of the choices of the rational states and intergovernmental negotiations (Ibid.) 
Moravcsik presents LI as an alternative approach to neo-functionalism. The main 
point of criticism and the reason why there is a need for an alternative approach is 
neo-functionalism’s inadequate explanation of European integration (Moravcsik 
1993: 474). It is Moravcsik’ argument that neo-functionalism missed the target 
when predicting that the EU would develop through technocratic mechanisms 
which would lead to further integration (Ibid: 476). The EU, on the contrary, has 
developed on the basis of intergovernmental bargains, which is what LI seeks to 
define and explain (Ibid.).  
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2.1.1 State Preferences 
Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009) propose two basic assumptions of LI. The 
first assumption is that states are actors and all decision-making power is at play at 
the state level. The second assumption is that states are rational.  
LI is further based on a three tier model in regards to international bargaining. 
According to LI, states will start by defining their own preferences. Secondly they 
will try to negotiate a deal which will accommodate the preferences defined at tier 
one. At the third tier states will “… create (or adjust ) institutions to secure those 
outcomes in the face of future uncertainty” (Ibid: 69).  
According to Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig LI assumes that states have 
preferences, and such are what determines international bargaining. State 
preferences are dependent on specific issues and vary from policy issue to policy 
issue; they are by such standards “…neither fixed nor uniform” (Ibid.). The state 
preferences are formed by multiple domestic actors. 
Furthermore, it is Moravcsik’s argument that such preferences are shaped at the 
domestic level (Cini & Borragán 2010: 98). He stresses the importance of such 
preference when stating that; 
“National interests are, therefore, neither invariant nor unimportant, 
but emerge through domestic political conflict as societal groups compete for 
political influence, national and transnational coalitions form, and new policy 
alternatives are recognized by governments” 
(Moravcsik 1993: 481). 
It is therefore vital for the understanding of national preference formation that one 
knows of the domestic politics of the states involved in international bargaining 
(Ibid.). 
International Bargaining is a vital part of LI. This is referred to as substantive 
bargaining and is partly derived from rationalist institutionalism theory. The 
argument is that one state’s self-interest and maximization will seldom match that 
of another state, and it is therefore important that international negotiations are 
able to find solutions which will prove beneficial for all parties (Moravcsik & 
Schimmelfennig 2009: 70). As the bargaining is based on the individual state 
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preferences, it can be argued that intergovernmental institutions e.g. the EU have 
little influence on the final result of negotiations. It is the direct bargaining between 
the involved states that will determine the outcome (Cini & Borragán 2010: 98). 
Fundamentally, Moravcsik outlines two levels of international bargaining; this is 
where he draws on Putnam’s Two-level game; the demand side and the supply 
stage. On the demand level “a domestic preference formation process identifies the 
potential benefits of policy co-ordination perceived by national governments demand” 
(Moravcsik 1993: 481). Whereas at the supply stage: “... a process of interstate 
strategic interaction defines the possible political responses of the EC political system 
to pressures from those governments supply” (Ibid.). 
When the demand and supply stages interact during international negotiations, 
International bargaining takes place and the foreign policy of the involved states is 
outlined (Ibid.). When the demand and supply side interrelate, a zero sum game 
occurs where some states will get some preferences satisfied and other states will 
surrender some preferences. According to basic assumptions in LI, international 
negotiations are usually zero sum games but it is possible for them to become 
positive sum games as well (Cini 2010: 98). Moravcsik critiques other theories of 
European integration for not taking into account the interaction between the supply 
side and the demand side, but rather focuses in the two individually.  
The theoretical considerations about supply and demand builds on the assumption 
that states are rational actors, who will always seek to achieve the best possible 
solution for their own benefit. The relationship between the supply and demand 
side is exemplified by the below figure 1. 
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Figure 1 (Moravcsik 1993: 482) 
 
Figure 1 further incorporates the two International Relations (IR) theories of 
Liberalism and Intergovernmentalism. These two theories make up the foundation 
of LI, as Liberalism is not only a political ideology, but also presents the theoretical 
framework behind national preference formation and Intergovernmentalism deals 
with the strategies of international relations (Ibid.). 
2.1.2 Drivers and Brakemen 
In an enlargement process EU member states either act as Brakemen or Drivers in 
the accession of new member states. (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 81). 
There are multiple factors that will influence each member state in becoming either 
a Driver or a Brakeman. Drivers are the nations who support the acceding state in 
joining the EU. The choice of being a Driver is mainly founded in the possibility of a 
positive outcome for the Driver. Hence the support for the acceding country and the 
resources invested here in should be beneficial for the Driver and be in accordance 
to national preferences of the driving state (Ibid.). 
Opposite the Drivers are the Brakemen of the accession process. These are the 
member states who oppose the acceding nation’s entry into the EU. They will 
advocate against the nation in question and attempt to prolong the accession 
process, as the possibility of the candidate country acceding to the EU would be 
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counterproductive to the Brakeman’s state preferences. Once again the decision to 
become a Brakeman is based on national preferences (Ibid.). LI points out the 
determining factors in becoming a Brakeman or a Driver; economic gains or 
disadvantages, geopolitical aspects such as border sharing or periphery states and 
ideology (Ibid.). 
2.1.3 Power distribution 
Emphasis is placed on the distribution of power among the involved states, and how 
this influence is a vital process for international bargaining. Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig propose that: 
“Generally, those actors that are least in need of a specific agreement, 
relative to the status quo, are best able to threaten the others with non-
cooperation and thereby force them to make concessions; and those actors that 
have more and better information about other actors’ preferences and the 
workings of institutions are able to manipulate the outcome to their 
advantage”  
(Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig 2009: 70). 
It is therefore a matter of how much the individual states has to lose and how much 
they have invested in the final outcome, as well as a matter of how well informed 
they are about the opposite states preferences. The states that have the least to lose 
have the greatest bargaining power in regards to pressuring the counterpart. The 
strength of the individual state preference provides the negotiators with leverage in 
international bargaining and determines the relative gains and losses they risk 
(Moravcsik 1993: 499).  
 
Moravcsik draws on TLG theory when discussing international bargaining. The LI 
claim to TLG theory is found in relation to EU institutions and how national 
governments use such in order to “overcome domestic opposition more successfully” 
(Ibid: 515). Moravcsik applies the theoretical works of Robert D. Putnam, in his 
reflections on TLG.  
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2.2 Two-Level Game Theory 
TLG is an analytical framework in which an understanding of how domestic and 
international spheres interact during conflict resolution between nation states. The 
following section introduces relevant aspects of the theory that will be used in our 
analysis in order to better understand the multi layered conflict that makes the 
accession process gridlock. Our focus will be on the role of Turkey, Cyprus and the 
EU in the accession negotiations.  
When negotiators, in EU context governments, bargain internationally, they act on 
behalf of their domestic constituents to seek agreements that will satisfy the 
interests of these same constituents while simultaneously trying to avoid negative 
diplomatic or political consequences from the other end of the negotiating table. In 
this negotiation environment, both domestic interests affect the international 
bargaining and vice versa. It is the role of the negotiator to balance the two levels. 
Therefore to understand the process of international bargaining, it is necessary to 
cast a view on how domestic and international negotiations affect each other 
simultaneously, including possible peripheral agreements overlapping domestic and 
international interests (Putnam, 1988: 430). 
Putnam focuses on the possibilities and difficulties of this synergistic linkage 
between the domestic and international negotiations that central decision-makers 
undertake subsequent to making international agreements possible. 
The process of TLG is comprised of two stages in the process of negotiations: 
Level I: “bargaining between the negotiators, leading to a tentative agreement” 
Level II: “separate discussions within each group of constituents about whether 
to ratify the agreement” 
As in the case with Turkey and the EU accession negotiations, level I negotiations 
happens at the international level and as the name implies, official negotiations 
begins at this level and continues in an iterative process between level I and level II 
as the negotiator tries different agreements and probe the interests of their 
constituents. 
Each party has one negotiator, who will negotiate at the international level and at 
the domestic level. The role of the negotiator is therefore that of a double agenda, to 
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please the domestic interests while playing along the opposite part in the 
international arena in order to gain an outcome that is wanted and expected from 
Level II. 
2.2.1 Win-sets 
Win-sets are those outcomes of level I bargaining that will lead to ratification at 
level II; the range of possible agreements that the negotiator can get his constituents 
to ratify. In order for international negotiations to lead to an agreement, however, 
the win-set of each party must overlap. The relative size of each win-set will 
therefore determine the chance of ratification at both level II arenas. Therefore the 
bigger each win-set is, the bigger the chance of overlapping interests and thus the 
better the chance for ratification will be. The different determinants of the size of 
the win-sets are at the heart of TLG theory and will be discussed at further length in 
the following sections. 
 
Win-sets can be determined through three different stages. He terms this as 
“preferences and coalitions”, “institutions”, “negotiator’s strategies” (Putnam 1988: 
442). 
Preferences and coalitions exist at Level II negotiations. The size of the win-sets can 
be determined by the distribution of power between domestic constituents, those 
who favour an international agreement and those who oppose it. The reasons for 
either favouring or opposing such are determined by what the individual 
constituent stands to lose or gain. 
This is specified by Putnam when he states that “...the lower the cost of “no-
agreement” to constituents the smaller the win-set.” (Ibid.). 
The constituents are therefore divided into “isolationists” and “internationalists”. 
Putnam argues; that major powers such as the USA and the Russian Federation a 
higher amount of the constituents will be isolationists as they do not have the same 
to lose if international agreements are not reached. In contrast; smaller nations such 
as Belgium, the Czech Republic, Latvia etc. many will favour international 
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agreement, due to their small size, and relative gain from international cooperation 
(Ibid.). 
Furthermore another relevant determinant of the size of the win-sets, within 
preferences and coalitions, is the domestic interests that a negotiator will deal with 
in international bargaining, namely homogeneous1 and heterogeneous2 interests. 
Depending on which type of domestic reality the negotiator is faced with, different 
outcomes are desirable, as we will see in the following section. 
Homogenous domestic interests refer to the type of level I negotiations where the 
negotiator will try to get as much out of his counterpart as possible as it will 
maximize the chance of ratification at level II. These kinds of negotiations are 
specific for when the domestic consent to a desirability of getting i.e. the lowest 
price on gas imports or other, normally economic, issues where the rule of thumb is 
“the more, the better” (Ibid: 444). In these type of negotiations the main issue for the 
negotiator “is to manage the discrepancy between his constituents' expectations and 
the negotiable outcome” (Ibid.) as this will determine the win-set for the negotiator. 
If the counterpart is aware of the expectations at the other end, he will be able to 
pressure for an agreement, making him the winner of the relative advantage within 
the possible range of agreements (Ibid.). 
Negotiations at level I, where the domestic interests are heterogeneous, pose a more 
complex task for the negotiator as middle ground must be found in order to satisfy 
the constituents. The constituents may want an agreement in separate ends of the 
outcome range and therefore, the win-set will be near the centre in the range of 
outcomes. Thus, the negotiator might find silent allies at the counterpart level II 
negotiation table in these types of negotiations, in contrast to a homogenous conflict 
of interest. Therefore, heterogeneous type negotiations will more often foster 
international cooperation. 
As we will see in the analysis, this is the type of negotiation climate that EU’s chief 
negotiator is dealing with in accession processes (Ibid.). 
                                                 
1 Means domestic interests are coherent or fairly united 
2 Means that there are big differences in the domestic interests 
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The second determinant of win-set size is political institutions e.g. the EU. The power 
invested in such will affect the win-sets due to the mechanism, which political 
institutions make available to the negotiating powers, such as veto power or 
qualified majority voting (Putnam 1988: 448). The more complicated ratification by 
domestic partners becomes, due to institutional mechanisms, the higher the risk of 
involuntary defection becomes and ratification is increasingly apprehended. 
This is further established in regards to the power of national governments. If the 
ruling party enjoys a relative high amount of support from their constituents: “... the 
larger their win-set and thus the greater the likelihood of achieving international 
agreement.” (Ibid: 449). Win-sets are therefore also determined by the “state-
strength” and “state-autonomy” (Ibid.).  
Thirdly negotiators strategies; to reach successful negotiations, the win-sets of each 
negotiator will have to converge in order to come to an acceptable agreement for 
both parties and which can be ratified. If ratification fails, no positive outcome of 
negotiations is reached. Putnam stresses the need to distinguish between two types 
of non-ratification, Voluntary defection and Involuntary defection. Putnam argues 
that voluntary defection in international negotiations occurs when states reneges 
from their end of the bargain. This is however rarely the case as voluntary defection 
often will have high political and economic costs (Ibid: 439). 
Involuntary defection occurs when states cannot get their domestic constituents to 
ratify the agreement at hand (Ibid: 438). It is further Putnam’s argument that 
involuntary defection is extremely dependent on the size of the possible win-set 
(Ibid: 439). He emphasizes the difficulty in distinguishing between the two types of 
defection the argument is that it may be beneficial for the different actors to defect 
voluntarily, but make it appear as involuntary defection (Ibid.). A lot points to that 
EU might have done this, more than once, during the negotiations with Turkey, to 
great disappointment for the former. This only seem to have had real reputational 
costs for the EU in regards to the accession negotiations during the last decade, 
which is peculiar considering the time span of the negotiations. It can be explained 
by the question that Putnam raises of “how far reputations generalize from 
collectivises to negotiators and vice versa?”(Ibid: 439). 
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Reputation can affect the mutually perceived size of the other negotiators win-set 
and can thereby be a bargaining chip, but also represent a risk for non-agreement 
(Ibid.). In order to understand the dynamics of how reputation can influence the 
negotiations, an example is needed: Mutually, if one negotiator perceives the others 
win-set as small, it represents both a risk of breakdown and an opportunity to his 
counterpart. The risk of breakdown is apparent as the negotiator might be reluctant 
to commit to anything if he is worried that his counterpart will defect. The 
opportunity for the counterpart will be to pressure the negotiator to ratify a deal in 
the counterparts favour if he can create the illusion that the level I negotiations will 
have to be in his favour if he is to get the agreement ratified by his constituents 
(Ibid: 440). On the other hand the negotiator might use this uncertainty to pressure 
for more side-payments as the expected value of the agreement to the negotiator is 
lowered if he is not sure that his counterpart will be able to ratify the agreement 
(Ibid: 453). 
So far we have viewed win-sets as fixed positions but taking the effect of 
reverberation into account, win-sets become susceptible to external influence 
during the process of negotiations (Ibid.). Reverberation is the underlying 
restructuring of issues, payoffs that happens in the negotiation situation. This 
happens through deliberate attempts from the negotiators to enhance the win-sets 
of his counterpart’s level II constituents. This happens through “wooing” opinion 
leaders, establishing contact with opposition parties, offering foreign aid to a 
friendly, but unstable government, and so on (Ibid: 454) and is done in order to 
increase the chance of making an agreement which can be ratified, that will be 
advantageous to the negotiator. If the win-set of the counterpart is bigger, the 
negotiator will have more room for manoeuvring, more possible deals to strike, 
which will still be within the common win-set. Thereby he increases his chances of 
getting the better end of the bargain. 
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2.2.2 Bargaining power of negotiators 
Negotiation power is understood as the ability of the negotiator to succeed at level I 
negotiations. Depending on the negotiation environment, the size of win-sets can be 
radically affected by the balance of conferred powers of the implicated negotiators 
and the nature of the bargain (Putnam 1988: 439). Primarily the conferred powers 
are very closely tied to the reputation of the negotiator, the state as well as the 
formal powers of the negotiator: in the case of Turkey and the EU the negotiators 
have a very diverse power structure between them. If a state has a strong interest in 
striking a deal or the negotiator otherwise has a power base at his level II 
negotiation table, either by a strong backing from the public or formal powers, his 
win-set will be larger (Ibid: 437-440). Conversely if a negotiator has limited 
conferred powers, e.g. if the ratification process at his level II is bureaucratic or 
difficult, then his win-set will be limited. Counter intuitively, if the negotiator has 
power at his level II negotiation table, it will limit the negotiators bargaining 
advantage at level I; as will the interest in the bargain (Ibid: 439). This is the case as 
a negotiator that either has the ability to ratify a variety of deals at his level II 
negotiation table or/and has a strong interest in striking a deal will have a large 
win-set, and can therefore be pushed around more by his counterpart. However, this 
requires that the agreement can not only be ratified, but also implemented: if a 
negotiator can get an agreement ratified at level II, but the institutions of the state in 
e.g. a rising democracy limits the possibility of execution of the agreement, this will 
limit the win-set of the state and therefore might be a bargaining advantage for the 
negotiator. Conversely, if a negotiator has a very few powers conferred, he will have 
a narrow win-set and therefore be able to drive a hard bargain (Ibid: 437-440). 
However, if the chance of getting a deal struck is too narrow, the negotiating 
counterpart might narrow his own win-set in fear of striking a deal that will not be 
ratified or executed. These factors are relevant to look at when defining the win-sets 
of the negotiators (Ibid.). 
 
22 
 
2.2.3 The myth of the neutral broker 
The importance of TLG theory is the distinction between the two levels of domestic 
politics and international politics. What may easily be ignored by some is the role of 
the negotiator. The negotiator acts between the two levels and should be the only 
actor who functions in the limbo between the domestic and the international level. It 
can therefore be assumed that the negotiator is unbiased towards either the 
domestic or the international cause. This would however be a wrong and somewhat 
naive assumption as Putnam argues that empirical evidence points to the opposite 
fact; the negotiator will always be influenced by his or her own believes, and such 
will influence the outcome of negotiations (Putnam 1988: 457). 
The negotiator can have many interests in conducting international negotiations, 
even though they conflict with own interests. Negotiations at Level II can prove 
useful if he disagrees with his constituents at Level I, as he can claim that an 
agreement at Level II was impossible to avoid, but in fact he has used it to 
circumvent the domestic constituents in order to pass his own personal politics 
(Ibid.). In a similar way, it is also possible for the negotiator to present own 
domestic preferences at the international forum, and thereby change the 
negotiator’s state’s standing at the international level, once again circumventing the 
domestic constituents (Ibid.). The role of the negotiator therefore becomes 
increasingly important as “...he has, in effect, a veto over possible agreements” (Ibid.), 
and can thereby influence the outcome of the negotiations according to his own 
preferences.  
2.3 Critique of theory 
Critiques of LI claim that it is not a theory but rather a methodological approach. 
This point of criticism is based on Moravcsik’s combination of three already 
established theories in order to explain European integration, rather than 
formulating arguments that may discuss European integration. A further point of 
criticism is the lack of emphasis placed on supranational institutions such as the 
European Court of Justice and the European commission. Wincott (1995) argues 
that the importance of supranational institutions in European integration is down 
played to a critical extend (Ibid: 598). Wincott further critiques Moravcsik for 
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operating with a double standard when defining the process of preference 
formation. Moravcsik claims that national preferences are formulated by domestic 
actors, and that such preferences are followed by the state. It is Wincott’s argument 
that Moravcsik contradicts this when arguing that states will move to overcome 
such domestically defined preferences, in situations of international negotiation. 
Wincott specifies this by stating that “Moravcsik initially seemed to argue that … 
states could not gain autonomy from society; later this position is contradicted” (Ibid: 
601).  
 
LI is configured of a Supply and a Demand side. In order to explain these two sides 
Moravcsik proposes the use of three steps; state preferences, intergovernmental 
bargaining and institutional choice. We have chosen to refrain from using the step of 
institutional choice as we assume that the EU institutions, in which the negotiations 
take place facilitates legitimate negotiations between Turkey and the EU. 
Critiques of Putnam’s TLG framework have remarked that it is to simplify EU 
negotiations when assuming that there are two levels; the framework should rather 
be one of three levels. Lee Ann Patterson poses the idea that international 
negotiations are composed of three levels; the domestic level, the EU level, and the 
international level (Patterson 1997: 135). Patterson argues that it is necessary to 
include the EU as a third level of the game, as a great amount of power is vested at 
the community level and shall not be ignored by instead focusing on the domestic 
level and the international level (Ibid.). It is not within the scope of this project to 
include this third level. 
3. Methodology 
 
In the following section we will account for the research design and the 
methodological framework of the project and our choice of theory. Further we will 
conceptualize and operationalize our theory in order to arrive at a clear research 
strategy that will make it possible for us to answer our problem formulation and 
test our hypothesis in the analysis. 
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3.1 Research Design 
This project contains a case study of Turkey’s accession process. The case is unique 
in regards to other EU-accessions, as the accession process dates back to 1959 
where Turkey applied for associate membership and is therefore by far the longest 
accession period for any country. It is also unique in the sense that Turkey is both 
religiously and culturally different from the rest of both the candidate states and the 
member states. These aspects will however not be the main focus of this project. The 
analysis will instead focus on comparing politics and state preferences between 
Turkey and some of the member states in order to look at the state of the 
negotiations in the accession process. 
We will be looking at the EU both as a supranational institution with its own 
political agenda and its own political preferences and as an EU combined by many 
sovereign rational states; where each state has different agendas and preferences in 
order to give an outline of the bargaining environment in the EU. It is not within the 
scope of this project to investigate the opinions and state preferences of all 27 EU 
member states. We have therefore narrowed our focus to the most significant 
participants in the Turkish accession process: Germany, France, UK, Austria, Greece 
and Cyprus. These countries have been chosen on the background of two criteria; 1. 
The states that have relative bargaining power in EU and relatively strong interests 
in Turkey’s accession (Germany, France, UK, Austria), and 2. The states that have 
been directly involved in the Cyprus conflict (Cyprus and Greece). The condensed 
form of the preferences of these member states will, together with the official EU 
position, comprise the EU preference. As Turkey is the main focus of our project, the 
Turkish state preferences and opinions towards EU will also be investigated. The 
analysis will be based on these preferences and will be conducted utilizing the 
theoretical base of LI within the framework of TLG; the international bargaining 
arena, level I, and the domestic bargaining arena, level II. Level I will be the EU-
Turkey negotiations and level II will be the internal EU arena limited to the 
countries in focus and also the domestic arena in Turkey. Negotiations outside our 
chosen framework will not be considered in this project. There are certain 
limitations to our project that has to do with both our theory and our conscious 
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choice of subject. The limitations in regards to our theory of LI is that state 
preference is depicted as something dynamic and fluctuant. Therefore the state 
preferences will not be an exact depiction, but an approximation. The same applies 
when we define the win-sets, as these can change according to the progress of 
negotiations and also is affected by hidden factors or factors that are out of the 
scope of this project. Therefore the win-sets that we define will also be an 
approximation. 
Turkey’s accession process is a very complex matter which is made up of more than 
just the issue of Cyprus. We have chosen to limit our project to focus on this issue 
alone because we consider this to be the main reason that the negotiations between 
the EU and Turkey are not progressing. We will be using the framework of TLG to 
provide more in depth understanding from a different perspective than that of the 
existing literature. 
3.2 Choice of theory 
The theoretical framework of the project is comprised of LI and TLG. LI can give us a 
broad overview of the mechanisms that drives nation states in international arenas. 
The theory focusses on the rational state and the preferences and powers of these. 
Furthermore, international institutions, as EU, are seen as an arena for interstate 
bargaining and therefore the theory is applicable when looking at the accession 
process in EU. (Cini 2010: 98)  
This is the type of EU decision-making, which the theory intends to explain (Cini 
2010: 87-102). According to LI, EU as an institution does not play the pivotal role in 
the accession process; rather it is the individual member states that have the final 
say. Putnam and TLG continue the line of thought from LI and go further into detail 
of how the international and domestic levels interact in negotiation processes. TLG 
tells us more, in detail, what constitutes international negotiations and their 
possible outcomes.  
 
With these theoretical tools we will try to contribute to an understanding of how the 
Cyprus conflict influences the Turkish accession process to the EU. These two 
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theories are combined as they share a common ontology of realism where states are 
rational actors and share the main focus of bargaining. The fact that states are 
rational actors mean that we presume that governments will always try and act 
legitimately in accordance with their power base, which in a liberal democracy is the 
constituents. The motive is to stay in power and to remain a legitimate power hence; 
self-maximizing. This ontological stance is apparent and important in our analysis of 
state preferences because it enables us to consider the actions of the state to be in 
line with the state preferences. 
3.3 Conceptualization 
When looking at interstate-negotiations in an EU forum, we will be looking at four of 
the factors that determine how and in what direction the negotiations are 
progressing. The first factor for understanding the negotiations is state preferences; 
state preferences tells a lot about how a state will act in a given bargaining situation 
and under which circumstances it will commit to an agreement. The second factor is 
the different roles of the bargaining states. States can be either Drivers; wanting to 
promote a fast and positive outcome of the negotiations, or Brakemen; wanting to 
stall or completely stop negotiations. A third factor in interstate negotiations is win-
sets. As explained above, the bigger the common win-set is between negotiating 
states the greater the chance of an agreement (cf. chapter 2.2.1). Defining the win-
sets of the negotiating parties, and trying to locate possible overlaps, is therefore 
important to estimate possible outcomes of the negotiations. The fourth factor is the 
bargaining power of the negotiator. The investigation of this will give us a more 
comprehensive understanding of the win-sets. 
These four factors are all important to investigate when looking into a specific 
negotiation, in our case the accession of Turkey and how the Cyprus conflict might 
influence this. Besides these factors our theory incorporates several other concepts 
which we are going to use in order to get a more comprehensive analysis. 
 
27 
 
3.4 Operationalization 
3.4.1 State preferences 
State preferences are dynamic, issue-specific and defined by many different actors. 
In our analysis we will not be looking at how the state preferences are formed, but 
instead explore the current state preference of the countries we have chosen. We 
will focus on preferences towards Turkey’s accession into EU and towards the 
Cyprus conflict. In regards to Turkey, we will look at their preferences towards 
joining the EU. State preferences are important to our project as the member states 
preferences towards Turkey and the Cyprus conflict will influence how the member 
states will act in the EU. This will again affect how the EU will proceed when 
negotiating the accession, and conversely how Turkey might act in the negotiations. 
Therefore member state preferences are important as it will give us an idea of the 
general preference in level II towards Turkey’s accession (the internal EU) which 
will affect the negotiations with Turkey in level I (the international bargaining 
arena). State preferences will assist us in answering our problem formulation, as it 
will enable us to define who are Brakemen and Drivers in regards to Turkey’s 
accession, and how the Cyprus conflict may have influenced this distribution of 
roles, and thereby discuss the perspectives of such.  
We will identify the state preference of a specific country by looking at, among 
others, newspaper articles, as these can say something about the general 
governmental opinion, we will also look into white papers, journal articles and 
official notes regarding the issue in question as this will describe the official state 
preference. 
3.4.2 Drivers and Brakemen 
Drivers and Brakemen are interested in the opposite outcomes of interstate 
bargaining; Drivers want a positive outcome and will try and boost the negotiations 
whereas Brakemen will be in favour of no outcome at all and will try and stall the 
negotiations. This is relevant as it can help us identify those countries who are 
against Turkey’s accession and who is for, this will also give an idea of the general 
EU preference towards Turkey and the Cyprus-conflict. We will assume that a 
negative state preference towards Turkey’s accession will result in Brakemen 
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behaviour in the EU and vice versa. But to identify the true nature of the states and 
possible conflicts between preferences we will compare these with a look at who 
have blocked or promoted the accession process.  
3.4.3 Win-sets 
Win-sets are defined as the possible outcomes of negotiations at the international 
level I that will lead to ratification at the domestic level II (Putnam 1988: 437). In 
our project the EU win-set in Turkey’s accession process is defined by the sum of the 
different member state preferences along with the official accession criteria. 
Turkey’s win-set is comprised of its state preferences towards becoming an EU 
member state. The win-sets of EU and Turkey respectively are crucial in answering 
our problem formulation as it will give us an idea of the different possible outcomes 
of the negotiations, as well as give an explanation of the negotiating parties’ 
bargaining power and an idea of the direction of the preferences. As well as identify 
how and where the Cyprus conflict influence the size of the win-sets. 
3.4.4 Bargaining power of negotiators 
The success of a negotiator is defined according to his ability to reach an agreement 
at level I. This success depends on how much or little power the negotiator has 
conferred from level II, to use at level I. The size of the possible win-set for the 
negotiator depends on how high the state in question values an agreement. If an 
agreement is very attractive to the state, more power will be conferred to the 
negotiator. Oppositely, if there is little interest in an agreement, the power of the 
negotiator is also limited and both the size of the win-set and the possibility of 
ratification is reduced in size.  
In order to further define the win-sets of negotiations regarding the accession of 
Turkey, it is beneficial and to some extent necessary to account for the power and 
position of the negotiators. By doing so we will therefore be enabled to further 
define the win-sets and thereby explain the state of negotiations, in order to answer 
our problem formulation. 
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3.5 Empirical Research Field 
The main sources of our empirical material in this project are statistics, white 
papers, official documents and articles, books and journals. 
The statistics we have used are primarily from Eurobarometer, a part of the official 
EU institution. When working with statistics there are some important factors to 
keep in mind; we have been aware of how the data has been collected; which 
questions have been asked and how many have participated. We have furthermore 
been aware of the scope of the statistics, as this is a significant factor when 
comparing statistics between different countries. The numbers to be compared 
should preferably, and is, from the same period of time. 
When we use white papers, and other official documents, the purpose of the given 
document and the background on which the document has been written is relevant 
to keep in mind as this might influence how the document is to be understood. This 
means that we are aware of the publisher and the message in the document as a 
certain bias may be present. 
We have taken into consideration the background and publisher of the statistics and 
official documents used, as the publishing institutions and states may be biased in 
their portrayal of facts of high political relevance. 
When using online newspaper articles, we assess the credibility of the publishing 
source; in order to ensure the validity of the information used and to take into 
account possible biases. The same assessment is applied when using academic 
journal articles and books. 
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4. Contextualisation 
 
4.1 The EU enlargement: A Historical Perspective 
To understand the process and motivation behind an EU enlargement that might 
include Turkey, we will present a short historical overview of EU enlargement.  
 
Enlargement of the EU is an important part of the EU agenda (Schimmelfenning & 
Sedelmeier 2002: 500) as it has a major influence on both the political and 
institutional system in the EU (Ibid: 3). 
The EU enlargement has happened through six waves; in 1973 the first enlargement 
wave included the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the UK, in 1981 Greece was 
accepted as a member, in 1986 Spain and Portugal and in 1995 Austria, Finland and 
Sweden was accepted. The biggest enlargement wave was in 2004 where Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia were accepted as members. In 2007 the two latest members, Bulgaria and 
Romania were accepted. (EC 2007) 
The motivation for EU enlargement was fundamentally the same as the motivations 
leading to the initiation of the EC; a single market to foster internal prosperity and 
political harmonisation to avoid intra-European wars (Wallace 2002: 2). Further the 
wish of a stable growing economy in a more globalised world is also an important 
imperative of wanting further enlargement (Jørgensen & Lund 1997:10). 
The first provisions of enlargement were established in the treaty of Rome in 1957 
(Wallace 2002: 2). In article 237 of the treaty of Rome the accession conditions are 
laid out; Any European state can apply to the Council, which has to act unanimously, 
and the conditions for the admission will be agreed between the applicant and the 
member states (Treaty of Rome art. 237). In other words the accession criteria in 
1957 were very vague and applicants were assessed case-by-case. It was enough to 
be a European democratic state, but what this entitled was not concretely described 
(Cini & Borragán 2010: 5). 
The accession criteria were altered in 1993 at the Copenhagen council where the 
Copenhagen criteria were formulated. What had spurred this was that the 
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enlargement to Eastern Europe once more was discussed after several eastern 
European countries had showed economic progress (Wallace 2002: 10) 
 
“Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect 
for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy 
as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces 
within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on 
the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, 
economic and monetary union.” 
(Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council 1993) 
 
Accession after 1993 was then based on the Copenhagen Criteria and therefore 
more difficult; but also more transparent, as more was required of the applicant in 
terms of integration and conformity to the EU acquis communautaire (The current 
EU rules), while the rules were outlined so an applicant knew what was expected of 
them (Wallace 2002: 13). 
The current accession process is as explained above far more extensive and time 
consuming than it was before the Copenhagen criteria was introduced. To have a 
clear understanding of what Turkey has to go through before it can become a 
member, the process are laid forth below.  
4.1.1 The accession process 
When a country wishes to become a member of the EU it has, as previous stated, to 
live up to the Copenhagen criteria. Before this, there is however a longer procedure 
that the country has to go through (EC 2013). 
Any European country wishing to become a member who are willing to respect and 
promote the above mentioned principles, can apply for membership. 
Before a country applies for membership a closer relation with the EU needs to be 
established beforehand. This is achieved with the EU in form of Association 
Agreements (EEAS 2013). These agreements can have different names and 
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wordings but are essentially the same in aim, they are bilateral agreements between 
the EU and a third country, often promoting liberalisation of trade (Ibid.). 
These Association Agreements are also, but not always, used as a way of preparing a 
third country for applying for membership in the EU. The Agreements does not only 
hold agreements about trade and customs, but also seek to further the political 
relationship between the EU and the third country. Further “Since 1995 the clause on 
the respect of human rights and democratic principles is systematically included and 
constitutes an essential element of the agreement” (EEAS 2013). 
These agreements can also hold demands and benchmarks which the third country 
have to live up to, to be considered in the future as a candidate country (EC 2013). 
The third country is approved as a candidate country by the Council after receiving 
the Commission's opinion and the Parliament's assent (TFEU art. 49). The 
Commission’s opinion is based on how well the third country live up to the details in 
the Association Agreement and how well it meets the Copenhagen Criteria (EC 
2011).  
When a third country has been granted the status as candidate country the formal 
membership negotiations can begin although this does not necessarily happen right 
away. What is negotiated in the formal negotiations is how, when and under which 
conditions the different policy areas (chapters) of the acquis communautaire can be 
implemented in the candidate country. (EC 2013)  
Before negotiations start on each chapter a screening of the candidate country in 
connection with each chapter is made by the commission to evaluate if negotiations 
can be started right away, or if certain requirements have to be fulfilled first. 
Furthermore the Commission oversees the entire accession process to make sure 
that the candidate country progresses as expected, and also help the candidate 
country with guidance along with keeping the Council and the Parliament informed 
about the progress or lack of such. (EC 2013)  
Negotiation of the individual chapters cannot be concluded before all member states 
are satisfied with the candidate country. Once all the chapters have been negotiated, 
an Association Treaty is formulated. This is a treaty which consolidates the terms 
and conditions of membership. It has to be signed by the candidate country, all the 
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member states and have to have the support of the EU parliament, the Council and 
the Commission. Then it has to be ratified by the candidate country along with all 
the individual member states, and then the candidate country becomes a fully-
fledged member. When the treaty is to be ratified in the candidate country, the EU 
stresses the need for public support whether through approval by the national 
parliament or by a national referendum. (EC 2013) 
After the treaty has been signed and before it is ratified, the candidate country 
becomes an Acceding Country. This grants a privileged status to the country in the 
EU; “it is entitled to speak, but not to vote” (EC 2013). 
4.2 The Cyprus conflict 
In 1878 Turkey and the United Kingdom (UK) declared a joint defence agreement. 
The agreement made UK the administrator of Cyprus, while Turkey retained the 
sovereignty (Hughes 2011: 90). During and after the First World War, the UK and 
Turkey found themselves to be on opposite sides of the battlefield. The UK therefore 
annexed Cyprus in 1914. After the war, Turkey acknowledged British rule of Cyprus 
(Ibid.). 
In the years following the First World War Greek Cypriots began to make claim for a 
union with Greece. This was only stronger after the Second World War where a 
majority of 96% of the Greek Cypriots wanted unification with Greece (Ibid.). 
In 1959 efforts to reach a solution for Cyprus was made between Greece, the UK and 
Turkey. Among such efforts was the formulation of the “Treaty of Guarantee 
between the Republic of Cyprus and Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey” as 
well as the “Basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus” (Hughes 2011:91). The two 
agreements combined ensured the protection of the Turkish minority on the Island 
and that the three nations should “…prohibit all activity that promoted partition of 
the island…” (Ibid.) and “…guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and 
security of the Republic of Cyprus” (Ibid.). 
The Treaty of Guarantee and the Basic structure created stability in Cyprus that 
lasted for almost 3 years. It ended when the President of Cyprus at that time, 
Makarios, proposed amendments to the constitution, which would lead to further 
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division between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. This resulted in 
violent uprising and concluded in UN peacekeeping troops being stationed at Cyprus 
(Hughes 2011: 92). 
In 1974 the relative peace on the island was again broken when Turkish troops 
landed in Cyprus. After a long period of ethnic dispute between the Turkish and 
Greek Cypriots, Turkey invaded Cyprus, creating the divided island as is the case of 
today with TRNC in the north and the RC in the south (Ibid: 90-94). There has 
therefore existed a divided society ever since, with unrest characterizing the 
relations between the two parts. 
The Turkish invasion has been mentioned as the reason for the current Cypriot 
setting of conflict. Some will, however, also claim that it is the culmination of many 
unfortunate events occurring in the 20th century (Ibid: 94). 
Turkey’s argument to deploy troops in Cyprus was based on both an increase in 
ethnic brutality and Greek officers taking over government in 1974 (Çakir 2011: 
33). The coup d’état led by Greek officers was supported by the Greek government, 
which was at the time a military junta (Ibid.). 
The most recent developments in the conflict are that Turkey is considering 
supporting a two-state solution. This change comes as a response to recent years 
dispute over the discovered hydrocarbons in the sea surrounding Cyprus. The RC 
has started drilling without the consent of the Turkish Cypriots, and a two-state 
solution would solve the hydrocarbon issue as each state would then have the right 
to their respective undergrounds. (Todays Zaman 2013) 
The dispute over the offshore drilling has resulted in threats of military intervention 
from Turkish side as Turkey do not think that RC has the mandate to conduct the 
offshore drillings and conduct preliminary research without the consent of TRNC 
and further because Turkey does not accept the RC’ claims to the waters 
surrounding the island (The Economist 2013).  
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4.3 Turkey and EU membership 
4.3.1 A brief history of Turkey 
The modern Republic of Turkey was established in 1923 after the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire. Turkish nationalists had been fighting against the victorious Allies 
of the First World War for independence and this culminated in 1922 when the 
Turkish nationalist retaliated on a Greek attack and won. Turkey was then formally 
declared a republic in 1923 with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as the first president. He 
had been the leader of the nationalist before and during the fight for independence 
(Howard 2001: 85pp). 
The caliphate, which was the previous form of government was formally abolished 
in 1924 and replaced with a constitutional secular form of government, with a 
constitution consolidating a parliament elected by universal male suffrage 
(extended to women in 1934) (Howard 2001: 93,105). 
During Atatürks presidency extensive reforms were carried out, which changed 
Turkey both politically, socially and economically, towards a more western form of 
governance. Among other initiatives Islam was abolished as the state religion and a 
law code based on the German and Italian model was introduced. (Howard 2001: 
93-96, European movement 2009) 
After a serious display of public discontent over the government's failure to cope 
with economic recession a military coup took place in 1960. This happened once 
more in 1980, this time because the military did not think that the current 
government lived up to their promise of democratic reforms (Howard 2001: 134pp). 
A new constitution was drafted in 1982, which provided the military with certain 
rights over civilian matters (Ibid: 163). 
Various politicians have been Prime Ministers since then and in 2003 the current 
Prime Minister, Tayyip Recep Erdogan, came into office. 
4.3.2 Form of government 
Turkey is a republican parliamentary democracy; the Parliament is elected by direct 
public elections. The Turkish parliament, also called the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly (TGNA), has 550 members and who are elected for a term of four years. 
The parliament is furthermore based on a pluralistic party system, which elects a 
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president for a period of five years. The president appoints a prime minister and a 
cabinet (also referred to as the council of ministers). (Karpat 2004: 223-224). 
 
The duties of the parliament are to pass, amend and abrogate laws, and to supervise 
the cabinet. The President has duties both within the legislative, executive and 
judicial branch of government. The legislative powers amount to e.g. publishing 
laws, and call referendums in connection with constitutional changes. The executive 
authority of the President amounts to appointing the prime minister and the 
cabinet, along with appointing an array of other executives of the states. The judicial 
powers are to appoint and assist in appointing members of the Turkish court 
system.  
 
The Prime Minister is the de facto head of state of the executive branch. The duties 
of the Prime Minister are to supervise implementation of government policies and 
make sure the cabinet functions in a harmonised way. The duties of the cabinet is to 
“...formulate and to implement the internal and foreign policies of the state.” Each 
minister is accountable to the prime minister and the cabinet is accountable to the 
parliament  
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5. Analysis 
 
5.1 Turkey and the EU 
5.1.1 Turkey’s preferences towards the EU 
The first encounter between the nation of Turkey and the institution of EU was in 
1959 when Turkey applied for associated membership (EC 2013). Since then 
various agreements between Turkey and the EU has followed. A major 
breakthrough in the EU-Turkey relationship came in 1999 at the Helsinki summit 
where Turkey was officially granted the status of candidate country (BBC 2006), and 
in 2005 the official membership negotiations began (EC 2013).  
The reason for Turkey’s ambitions to become an EU member has previously been 
focused on the economic advantages of being a part of the EU. This has changed to a 
certain extent since the Euro was struck by the global debt crisis. Recently, the main 
negotiator and Minister for European affairs of Turkey, Egemen Bağış, has stated 
that he still believes in an EU with Turkey, but the possibility of Turkey becoming a 
member of the Eurozone has suffered during the crisis (Abbas 2013). In April 2013, 
the Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey said that “When there is a complete and serious 
eurozone, Turkey may want to participate in it someday in the future” (Hurriyetdaily 
2013). 
The discouraged attitude towards the Euro is an indicator of how the state 
preferences of Turkey are changing. Joining the EU would mean adopting the Euro 
and so the economic gain might not be the greatest argument for Turkey to join the 
EU anymore but there are still benefits to obtain. 
In Turkey the EU still portrays an exclusive European club that can help the 
country's economic situation. This is especially seen in relation to the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU. Turkey is a nation with a large rural area, with 
25.5 per cent of its people employed in the agricultural sector in 2010 (Giray: 2012). 
The agricultural sector is however very underdeveloped and poorly industrialized 
compared to the rest of the EU. Turkey would therefore benefit a lot from the 
economic support the CAP offers; however it will prove costly and strenuous on the 
EU budget. 
38 
 
Turkey also stands to gain in regards to its role in the international community. 
Turkey’s security profile can gain considerable credibility if accessed in to the union 
(MFA Turkey 2013). Bağış, substantiates this by stating that Turkey “believe that EU 
is the grandest peace project of the history of mankind” (Bağış 2013). 
The EU can prove very efficient in order for Turkey to balance its position as a 
midway between the Western world and Asia. The EU will open doors to political 
power in the international community, but Turkey will still be able to be a major 
player in Middle Eastern and Asian affairs. Bağış confirms this by saying that “This 
peace project is still a continental one, but when Turkey joins the EU we can help to 
transform it to become a global one” (Bağış 2013). 
Although the Turkish government has pursued a positive EU strategy the public 
opinion has however changed radically since 2004. In October 2004, 63% of the 
Turkish population had a positive image of the EU (European Union 2013). Since 
then the attitude towards the EU has dropped significantly to 32% of the population 
in May 2012 (European Union 2013). The significant drop might be explained by the 
accession of Cyprus in 2004, but the long and slow accession process is also an 
important factor and is resulting in the Turkish public’s diminishing hope in ever 
becoming an EU member state (Abbas 2013). 
In general, Turkey is favourably disposed towards becoming an EU member. There 
are still more gains than losses by acceding, even though recent trends show that 
Turkey is becoming more critical towards the European project. 
5.1.2 Turkey’s role as candidate country 
For Turkey to ever to become an EU member there are numerous demands they 
have to live up to. This has resulted in extensive reforms but also in a deadlock 
partly caused by the strained relationship with Cyprus. Below is a short description 
of the current political landscape in Turkey, followed by an account of how Turkey 
tries to progress its accession but also how it is in some cases an obstacle to its own 
accession.  
In the current political landscape in Turkey; the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) has the majority of the seats in TGNA. The leader of the AKP, Tayyip Recep 
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Erdogan, is the Prime Minister (al-monitor 2013). The current President is Abdullah 
Gül and has been President since 2007 (Today’s Zaman 2012). 
During the last couple of years prime minister Erdogan has pushed for changes to 
the Turkish political system; an amendment to the Turkish constitution was passed 
in 2007 to change the election of the President from a parliamentary election to a 
public election and altering the terms from seven years to five years (Today’s Zaman 
2012, Presidency of the Republic of Turkey 2013). 
 
There have been speculations about whether or not the amendment is for the 
benefit of Erdogan himself, as he would not have been able to run for prime minister 
again, as he has already been in office for the maximum of three terms. The 
amendment makes the presidential election a public matter, and provides Erdogan 
with the chance of running for president (Today’s Zaman 2012, Eurasianet.org 
2012). 
 
The EU has not commented on these speculations, but if Erdogan runs for President 
and is elected after three terms as Prime Minister, it could have a negative influence 
on Turkey’s accession negotiations as it could be perceived as a way for Erdogan to 
stay in power. 
However further amendments to the constitution was passed by referendum in 
2010; most of these amendments were by and large changes which were directed at 
making the Turkish constitution more democratic and incorporate human rights to 
a higher degree (Reuters 2010, The Economist 2010), which could indicate that the 
amendments solely are democratization. 
 
In May 2012 a commission called the Constitution Reconciliation Commission was 
established to make a draft on an entire new constitution. The commission consists 
of three members from each of the elected parties, 12 members in total. Currently 
the members of the Commission has problems reaching an agreement, and Erdogan 
along with his party AKP has threaten to push AKP’s constitutional proposal for 
referendum, if the Commission does not reach an agreement in the near future. The 
40 
 
proposal from AKP and Erdogan includes changes which would bestow more power 
on the role of the president, which adds further to the speculation about Erdogan 
wanting to run for president (al-monitor 2013). However, the argument is that the 
last years of constitutional changes is largely due to the demands from the EU about 
turning Turkey into a country that can live up to the EU accession criteria (The 
Economist 2010, Cengiz 2013). 
 
In the newest progress report about Turkey, the EU has expressed its satisfaction 
with the democratic intention of the constitutional changes but stresses that there 
are issues that still need to be addressed in consideration of a new constitution, like 
the issue of institutional transparency (European Commission 2012: 7pp). Generally 
the EU is supportive of the changes in the Turkish state and acknowledges the 
progress there is made, however a lot of matters still have to change before the EU 
definitively will accept Turkey as a member state (European Commission 2012). 
One point of critique in general regarding all Turkey’s reforms is the lack of 
institutional and administrative capacity in the rural areas to actually implement the 
reforms in some policy areas (European Commission 2012).  
 
Besides the formal criteria, which Turkey still needs to fulfil to the EU’s satisfaction, 
Turkey has made some decisions which have caused the accession process to slow 
down. When the RC held the presidency of the EU council from July to December 
2012, Turkey chose to freeze all the negotiations and cooperation with the EU. This 
was partly done as a reaction to the RC’s hydrocarbon drilling negotiations with 
Israel specifically and as a display of discontent towards the Cyprus conflict in 
general (Reuters 2011). The EU was not pleased with this uncooperative attitude 
but could do little more than emphasize the importance of respecting the EU 
institutions (European Commission 2012). The blockade could be seen as an 
attempt to pressure the EU to find a solution to the Cyprus problem, but as the EU 
council has limited powers in the accession process the blockade was more a 
symbolic act than an actually power display (Ananicz 2012). 
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An action that has had huge consequences for Turkey’s accession process is 
Turkey’s persistent refusal of applying the Additional Protocol to the RC. The 
Additional Protocol is a framework for free movement of goods and Turkey’s 
ratification of it is a step towards fulfilling the EU accession criteria (EC 2013). As 
long as Turkey is not willing to apply the Additional Protocol to the RC, the EU has 
blocked eight negotiating chapters which cannot be opened until the Additional 
Protocol applies for the RC as well (EC 2013). Turkey has however stated that it is 
not willing to open its market to the RC as long as there are external trade sanctions 
uphold against TNRC (EUbusiness 2013, DFAT 2013). 
Besides the blocking of eight chapters from the EU, other countries have also 
blocked some of the negotiating chapters resulting in only three chapters being 
open for negotiations (Insel 2012: 2). These three chapters if opened will however 
damage Turkey’s market competitiveness, and therefore Turkey is reluctant to open 
these (Ibid.).  
Regardless of these serious obstacles to Turkey’s accession both Turkey and the EU 
uphold the aspiration for future membership. In 2012 a new Positive Agenda was 
agreed upon. The agenda has the goal of bringing Turkey and the EU closer on 
several areas but at the same time trying to work around the Cyprus issue (Ananicz 
2012). 
 
Turkey’s accession into the EU has been subject to many different national, political 
and ideological preferences. All existing members of the EU has an opinion on 
Turkey as a co-member, as well international institutions and third country 
members; this is a factor on the speediness or lack thereof in Turkey’s accession. In 
the following we will not list all of the current member states, but only touch upon a 
handful; namely Germany, France, Austria, United Kingdom, Greece and Cyprus.  
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5.2 State preferences 
Table 1 below shows the official opinion of a number of EU member states in 
regards to Turkey as a fellow member state over a nine year period. With this as a 
backdrop the countries previously selected will be categorized into Brakemen and 
Drivers in accordance to Moravcsik’s theoretical framework. 
 
3 
5.2.1 Brakemen 
 
The Republic of Cyprus  
The RC has a rather tense attitude towards Turkey’s accession; this is mainly based 
on the long and troublesome history they share.  
When the RC entered the EU in 2004 they chose to keep a low profile and refrained 
from using their veto right against Turkey, as a token of good will (Melakopides 
2010: 107). 
                                                 
3
 “Table 1 shows the positions of the governments. The plus sign stands for a position in 
favor of advancing Turkey’s membership prospects; the minus sign indicates a preference 
for blocking these prospects. In 1997 and 1999, this meant being in favor of or opposed to 
giving Turkey a concrete membership perspective by according the country candidate 
status. In 2004/2005, this referred to opening accession negotiations with Turkey. In 2006, 
the minus sign stands for suspending many negotiating chapters and creating institutional 
hurdles for resuming negotiations; the plus sign indicates a preference for not freezing 
negotiations at all or suspending only a few chapters.” (Schimmelfennig 2009: 5) 
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During 2005 and 2006 the good will diminished and the RC has since, on multiple 
occasions, threatened to exercise their veto right in the EU in order to stall and 
prevent the accession negotiations of Turkey from developing (Melakopides 2010: 
107). As for now they are blocking the opening of six negotiating chapters. It could 
be argued that some of these chapters has to do with Cyprus’ own national interest 
and the violent history between Cyprus and Turkey; 2-”Freedom of movements of 
Workers”, 15-”Energy”, 23-”Judiciary and Fundamental rights”, 24-”Justice, Freedom 
and Security”, 26-”Education and Culture”, 31-”Foreign, Security and Defence Policy” 
(MFA Turkey 2013). The energy chapter and the chapters which has to do with 
human and judicial rights is directly linked with the current gas dispute between 
Cyprus and Turkey and the claim that Turkey has violated human rights and that 
Turkey is in breach of international conventions being present in Cyprus. This is 
further supported by the fact that all these chapters are chapters which the EU 
Commission in their progress report describe as ‘moderate advanced’ which mean 
that Turkey is on the right path albeit still has some way to go (European 
Commission 2012).  
 
The RC claims that they are keen to settle the Cyprus problem, despite their actions 
indicating otherwise. Turkey may not be able to accede to the EU without solving 
the Cyprus conflict, and the Cyprus conflict may not be solved without letting 
Turkey accede to the EU. In a situation of negotiations, the RC’s strongest point of 
argument against Turkey’s accession is the critical situation on the island. The RC is 
therefore able to use the conflict as a bargaining tool, and argue that they will 
prevent Turkey from joining the EU, unless the conflict is solved. Turkey may on the 
other hand argue that no matter how many reforms they will carry out, it will be 
pointless unless the RC is willing to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. 
Furthermore Turkey will not recognise the RC (Kakouris 2010) and thereby lift the 
embargo on import form the RC, unless a solution is found. One could therefore 
argue the situation as being in a state of deadlock. 
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Furthermore, The RC has gained an indisputable advantage when they joined the 
EU. Since their accession, the attractiveness or need for an agreement has been 
lowered, as they now enjoy multiple benefits derived from their EU membership 
(Economist 2009). They therefore enjoy the freedom of a non-agreement to a larger 
extend than the Turkish Cypriots, and are therefore at liberty to pressure Turkey on 
the basis of their own EU membership (Moravcsik 2009: 70p) .  
 
The RC could have a security based interest in letting Turkey accede to the EU, as 
this would lead to further democratic reforms which will reduce the role of the 
military in Turkey. This would provide the RC with a more stable neighbour and 
could reduce Turkey’s role in Cyprus as a guarantor power towards the RC. Similar 
to the preferences of Greece, the RC could benefit more from having Turkey with 
them, than against them (Kotsiaros 2010: 78). 
 
Officially the RC currently support Turkey’s aspiration for membership (MFA 
Cyprus 2012), but considering RC’s reluctance towards advancing the accession 
process further, the RC can be considered a Brakeman in Turkey’s accession. 
Further considering the way the RC has stalled the process could indicate that it is 
done out of national interest in regards to the conflict and not out of a consideration 
for what could be most beneficial for the EU.  
 
Germany 
Germany has had an obvious effect on the pace of the Turkish accession process 
(Knaus & Altfuldisch 2013:59). The current official opinion of Germany is quite 
reluctant towards Turkey’s membership, but this has not always been the case. 
Fluctuations at the domestic political scene have occurred. The accession process 
has been influenced by such i.e. under the Kohl administration when the reluctance 
spiked and led to a “diplomatic fall-out”; and oppositely under the Schroder 
administration in positive terms mentioned the possibility of Turkey becoming a 
member (ibid.). Germany has therefore acted as both a Brakeman and a Driver 
depending on who governs. Under the current administration the official opinion of 
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Turkey’s future in the EU is conflicted but generally opposed. The conflict is evident 
within the government as the two governing parties have diverging positions on 
Turkey becoming a member (Ibid: 26). Chancellor Angela Merkel has stated that a 
Strategic Partnership in the EU was an alternative and a possible solution to Turkey 
not receiving a full membership (Böttger & Maggi 2010:29), this has not been 
completely welcomed in the German administration or in the EU.  
Furthermore the conflict in Cyprus is urged resolved by the German Chancellor 
Merkel; she stresses that the RC has shown willingness to end the feud and 
therefore the next resolving act should be Turkey’s (Impey 2011). 
It may be the case that Germany is experiencing split preferences and the diverging 
opinions is not only found among the population or between the opposition and the 
government; but within the government itself. This will make the job of the 
negotiator, in this case Angela Merkel, more complex, than if the state preferences 
were clearly defined and rendered possible to negotiate in accordance with.  
Internal splits aside; Germany is considered a Brakeman as the official opinion still 
is reluctant towards a full membership to Turkey. 
 
France 
France is also playing a significant role in the prolonging of the accession of Turkey 
although the former president Jacques Chirac did support Turkey’s accession and he 
played a vital part in the decision of the Helsinki Summit in 1999 (Monceau 2010: 
17). Although when the eastern enlargement was concluded in 2004, Chirac stated 
that any further enlargement should undergo a referendum, it can be argued that he 
did so in order to satisfy his political backdrop whom was not impressed by the 
Turkish friendly approach Chirac had taken (Ibid.). It was at this time that the 
French also mentioned the privileged partnership as an alternative to Turkish full 
membership. This is a clear example of how the negotiator (here Chirac) needs to 
balance between the preference of his constituents and the EU preference; Chirac 
was criticized for his friendly politics towards Turkey so he followed the German 
suggestion of a privileged partnership to satisfy both his domestic level along with 
showing goodwill towards Turkey in EU.  
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In 2007 Nicolas Sarkozy was elected president and it seems that it has almost been a 
personal agenda for the former president to prevent Turkey’s admission into the EU 
(Insel 2013: 53). Since Sarkozy entered into office in 2007 the French 
administration has blocked five chapters4 in the accession negotiations; based on 
the argument that an opening of these five chapters will be a commitment to 
accession (Ibid: 50, MFA Turkey 2013).  
The change in attitude from Chirac’s pro-Turkey to Sarkozy’s anti-Turkey, greatly 
illustrates how much the personal preference of the negotiator influence the opinion 
brought to the negotiation table by the negotiator. This is further supported by the 
fact that both Chirac and Sarkozy belonged to the same pro-EU political party 
(Rozenberg 2011: 10). France was one of the first member states to emphasise that 
Turkey is not geographically situated in Europe, and use this as an argument against 
Turkey becoming a member. The debate became very public and was instrumental 
in forming the public opinion and the question of Turkey’s accession was hence 
politicized. All of which has led to France being perceived in Turkey as the anti-
Turkish shield of Europe (Insel 2013: 55). Since the referendum in 2012, in which 
François Hollande was elected president, the French political landscape has been in 
a state of transition on several policy areas, amongst others also the French attitude 
towards Turkish membership. Hollande has started to soften the hard line towards 
Turkey slightly. It is however a difficult balancing act, as the previous opposition 
towards Turkey was grounded in a negative public opinion. Hollande therefore has 
to change the public opinion simultaneously as expressing a more positive attitude 
in the EU. Because of this Hollande is only talking baby-steps in its new strategy; this 
means that there has been speculation about the possibility of France lifting its 
blockade on some of the negotiating chapters, and hence stop opposing Turkish 
membership (Pop 2013, Güvenç 2013). However nothing concrete has been done 
yet and the official French opinion is still in opposition to Turkish membership. 
                                                 
4
 The five chapters are: 11- “Agriculture and Rural Development”, 17-”Economic and Monetary 
Policy”, 22-”Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments”, 33-”Financial and 
Budgetary Provisions” and 34-”Institutions” (MFA Turkey 2013) 
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Therefore, as for now, France can be said to be a Brakeman in the negotiations 
(Darnis 2012: 6p).  
The French attitude towards Turkey in the EU reflects the concept of the ‘myth of 
the neutral broker’ very well, as the French preference in the EU has changed in 
accordance with the opinion of the chief negotiator despite the public opinion in 
France being fairly stable on opposing Turkey membership; this can also be seen 
from the chart below. 
 
(Eurobarometer 2013a) 
Moreover the French position, in regards to the Cyprus conflict, is supportive 
towards the RC, and it is the French opinion that the next diplomatic move should 
come from Turkey (France Diplomatie 2010). 
Even though there is a shift in the political environment at the moment; France is 
still considered a Brakeman in the Turkish accession process. 
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Austria 
Though they are one of the smaller member states in the EU, Austria has attracted 
attention as being among the hardest opponents of Turkish membership. While 
most of the opponents have had changes in their preferences towards Turkey, 
depending on the party formation of the government, Austria has been persistent in 
this matter. This could be explained by the fact that all the major political parties on 
both left and right, including nearly 80% of the population oppose Turkish 
membership (Woods 2004: 15). Their scepticism spurs mainly from questions about 
difference in norms, religion and migration communities which are growing in 
Austria. Though there is no doubt that the Austrian state preference opposes the 
Turkish accession, as is quite clearly expressed through their constant opposition cf. 
table 1. The reason behind could be more than just scepticism towards Turkey and 
could have to do with the country’s scepticism towards the EU project itself, which 
have been increasing since their accession to the EU in 1995 (Günay 2010: 94). In 
2006 Austria threatened to block Turkey’s accession negotiations, due to problems 
surrounding the accession of Croatia, their neighbour and fellow Christian country. 
Austria had backed Croatia in applying for EU membership, and believed that 
Croatia had undergone considerable improvements in the requested policy areas. 
This combined with their significant scepticism towards an EU with Turkey, made 
them threaten to block the Turkish accession negotiations. Austria has further made 
strong diplomatic ties to one of the other main Brakemen of Turkey’s accession, the 
RC. This is a worsening of the Austria-Turkey relations (Watt 2005). Even though 
Austria is a small EU member state, they do have leverage within the union, and is 
perhaps the nation that has taken the strongest stand in regards to the question of 
Turkey’s accession. 
The scepticism towards Turkey acceding to the EU makes Austria a hindrance and 
therefore a Brakeman in the accession negotiations with Turkey. 
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5.2.2 Drivers 
 
The United Kingdom 
The UK has always been the most persistent member state in encouraging Turkish 
accession to the EU (Schimmelfennig 2009: 6) and as seen in table 1 above they have 
been in favour of advancing this process in previous votes. 
 
On the 10 of October, 2012 the Commission released their annual progress report 
on Turkey, giving their account of the current state of the accession process. UK 
Minister of State for Europe David Lidingtons response to the report suggests that 
the positive UK position continues: 
 
“… enlargement is one of the EU’s greatest achievements and remains a priority 
for the UK. The future of all the countries of the Western Balkans, Turkey and 
Iceland lies in the EU and we remain strong supporters of this future. “ (Gotev 
2012) 
 
The UK holds a pro-enlargement policy, a policy which should entail Turkey. The UK 
government is unusually active in supporting the Turkish accession process, doing 
so in politically expressing their position as seen above, but also financially. 
According to the official website of the UK government, they are currently 
contributing financially to projects regarding freedom of expression, human rights 
and anti-corruption (Gov.uk 2013). These are areas in which Turkey needs to 
improve in order to fulfil the demands of the EU, in order to accede to the union. 
 
In the 2012 Foreign Affairs Committee report on UK-Turkey relations and Turkey’s 
Regional role, the importance of a strategic-partnership with Turkey is stressed. 
This is however complicated by the human rights issue currently existing in Turkey; 
an issue which is also complicating the Turkish accession to the EU (FCO 2012). The 
UK is not unconditional in its support for Turkish membership, but is actively 
contributing to a solution of the obstacles to the accession. 
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The support which the UK is offering Turkey is based on the possible gains they may 
derive from Turkey becoming a member. The assumption that the state is a rational 
actor makes it possible to assess that the UK possess a set of clearly defined state 
preferences in favour of an EU with Turkey. It is classical Driver behaviour, as 
described by Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009: 81). The UK considers Turkey 
an investment which will lead to a high return in the form of an expanded internal 
market and in extension a valuable trade partner.  
 
The UK could have hidden motives in this regard: They have from the beginning of 
their own membership been in favour of widening before the deepening of 
integration in the EU. One could speculate coherence between the UK’s desire to 
curb the progress of the deepening by advocating for widening instead (Woods 
2004: 16). 
 
Furthermore in regards to the conflict residing in Cyprus; the UK is officially 
supporting and actively contributing the UN in achieving a settlement which is 
desirable for both parties: “supporting bi-communal activity in Cyprus to help 
publicise the benefits of a comprehensive settlement” (Foreign Affairs Committee 
2013). All of this combined shows strong Driver tendencies and the UK will be 
regarded as such. 
 
Greece 
The Greek preference towards Turkey’s accession can be divided into two periods; 
before and after the Helsinki summit in 1999. 
The rather tense EU-relationship with Turkey had its beginning when the two 
historically rivalling countries both applied for an association membership, with the 
EEC, in 1959. The two countries had prior to the application process entered into a 
“Gentlemen agreement” which stated that they would support each other in the 
negotiations of the association agreements (Cakir, 2011:11). An agreement which 
they both kept until Greece, as the first of the two applicant countries, signed their 
association agreement in 1961. It was at this point Greece started to lobby against 
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Turkey when it came to agricultural concessions in the Turkish association 
agreement, furthermore Greece requested to be informed of developments in the 
negotiations of the Turkish agreement (Ibid: 13). 
Since there was no formal accession protocol at the time both the EU and the two 
candidate countries were on a new territory and while Turkey suffered a coup d’état 
and Greece did not at this time, the EEC was now considering different approaches 
to the two applicants, this, combined with the Cyprus conflict, also contributed to a 
animosity between Greece and Turkey (Ibid.). Needless to say the relationship with 
Greece has been strained, but through recent years softened by unexpected external 
factors such as; the earthquakes that devastated both Greece and Turkey, which led 
to a collaboration in rebuilding and aid (Kinzer 1999) furthermore the joined 
actions on the war against terror has widened the two countries collaboration 
(Euronews, 2013). 
 
Before the Helsinki summit Greece strongly opposed Turkish accession, and directly 
worked against Turkish-EU relationship by pursuing a veto-strategy towards 
Turkey (Grigoriadis 2003: 2). The Greek state preference before the Helsinki 
summit can be said to be largely formed by the long and often violent history 
between the two countries (Sussman 2001), which has resulted in a continuously 
tense relationship. After the Helsinki summit Greece changed its attitude and 
strategy towards Turkish accession to a more positive one (Kotsiaros 2010: 73). The 
more positive attitude did however start some years before in 1995 when Greece 
lifted its veto against Turkey. The change of attitude was though not entirely based 
on new found goodwill towards Turkey, but more a question of national interest 
(Grigoriadis 2003: 8-9). Before lifting its veto in 1995 Greece had become aware of 
that their attitude towards Turkey was obstructing the Turkish-EU relationship, and 
that this attitude did not foster much sympathy within the EU; as this was 
recognized as a way of using EU instruments for advancing Greece’s own national 
interest. Greece came to the realization that they could still pursue its goal of 
excluding Turkey just without the negative reputation the vetoes fostered, as many 
other EU member states were reluctant towards Turkey as well (Ibid). 
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After the Helsinki summit the Greek strategy towards Turkey’s accession changed 
towards a more positive constructive approach where it officially supported the 
accession of Turkey. This shift was partly due to the then Prime Minister of Greece; 
George Papandreou, as well as, partly due to the promise from EU concerning the 
start of the accession negotiations with Cyprus (Ibid: 3). The official opinion is now 
that it would be more beneficial to Greece if Turkey were to become a member, and 
they therefore support Turkey’s accession though still with the conditions that 
Turkey has to live up to the accession criteria. (Kotsiaros 2010, Grigoriadis 2003)  
The Greek government may officially have moved passed the negative attitude 
towards Turkey, but the Greek public is more reluctant, as can also be clearly 
viewed at a survey made by Eurobarometer: 
  
(Eurobarometer 2013b) 
Around 80 % of the Greek public was not in favour of Turkish accession in 2008. 
One reason for this opposition could be the historical aspect that could be said to 
play a larger role among the public, which may not be aware of the benefits of 
Turkey as an EU member, than with the Greek politicians (Kotsiaros 2010: 79p). 
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The official change in attitude towards Turkey can also be viewed as a change in 
state interests. With reference to the theoretical assumptions of Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig, the Greek state preference has changed in order for Greece to 
accommodate their national interest in the best possible way. A change in attitude 
towards Turkey’s accession to the EU is not synonymous with a change in attitude 
towards the conflict in Cyprus. The Greek official position is supportive of the RC 
 
As discussed above, the member states have very heterogeneous interests: Some 
countries (Brakemen), Austria, Germany and France are quite adamantly set on the 
idea that Turkey instead of membership should be offered a privileged partnership. 
Oppositely (Drivers) the UK and Greece is pushing for the reopening of the 
suspended chapters in order for Turkey to become a member as fast as possible. 
Without member state Drivers the prospects for Turkish accession would be 
considerably reduced, but given that some of the most influential member states are 
against Turkey’s accession, membership could have long prospects. What can also 
be seen from the member state preferences is that there is an awareness of the 
Cyprus conflict, but it is to a greater extent the individual member states 
preferences towards Turkey that influence how they perceive a future Turkish 
membership and not so much Turkish involvement in the Cyprus conflict.  
5.3 The EU preference towards a Turkish membership 
The state preferences of the above member states constitute a part of the collected 
EU preference towards the Turkish membership. What the different state 
preferences depict is that the EU domestic level is very heterogeneous when it 
comes to the question of Turkey. 
However EU also acts as a collected entity with a preference on its own. This 
preference in mainly made up of the acquis communautaire which sets the legal and 
political framework for the EU’s actions. With regards to Turkey’s membership the 
EU has a promising attitude; Turkey has received status as a candidate country and 
this entails ‘future membership’. As previously stated there are a lot of demands and 
agreements Turkey has to live up; one such agreement is the Additional Protocol. 
54 
 
Turkey has not applied this protocol to Cyprus, and this is for the EU a legal obstacle 
to membership resulting in the blocking of eight negotiating chapters. Theses 
chapters5 are all chapters which cannot be either open nor closed before Turkey has 
applied the Additional Protocol to all EU member states, including Cyprus. 
With regards to the Cyprus conflict EU supports the UN efforts but has not actively 
participated in finding a solution (European Commission 2012). The EU stresses the 
importance of Turkey supporting a peaceful and comprehensive solution to the 
problem but it is not the main argument from EU side against Turkey’s accession. 
Where EU places its emphasis is with regards to respecting and upholding the EU 
acquis which Turkey currently is not doing with regards to the Additional Protocol 
and in regards to the dispute of Cyprus’ offshore drilling; as a state's sovereignty to 
its underground is an essential part of the EU acquis (European Commission 2012). 
These obstacles aside EU does actively support Turkey’s efforts to become a 
member. This is done among others things with the IPA - an instrument designed to 
structurally and financially support accession reforms through funds. The program 
also has the purpose of ensuring that political and economic reforms will be easier 
and help prepare the candidate countries for the responsibilities connected with 
being a member. The program is designed to give different kinds of support 
depending of the needs of the candidate countries. (EC 2013) 
The funding that is available for allocation in Turkey in 2013 is €902.9 million. 
Turkey can apply for this money through different IPA components that each 
support different areas (EC 2013). Also the Positive Agenda, as mentioned earlier, 
shows a wish from the EU of a closer association despite the Cyprus conflict. 
EU’s much differentiated domestic level along with its own preferences can 
influence within what framework the Turkish membership negotiations are taking 
place. This will be elaborated in the next part of the analysis. 
 
                                                 
5
 1-”Free Movements of Goods”, 3-”Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services”, 9-
”Financial Services”, 11-”Agriculture and Rural Development”, 13-”Fisheries”, 14-”Transport Policy”, 
29-”Customs Union”, 30-”External Relations” (European Commission 2012) 
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5.4 Two-level game Analysis - the state of the negotiations between 
Turkey and the EU 
 
In this part of the analysis we will determine the size of the EU win-set and the 
Turkish win-set in order to outline the state of the negotiations between them and 
look at the possibility of an agreement if there is an overlap between the two win-
sets. First we will have a look at how the state of negotiations and the condensed 
form of the member state preferences constitutes the EU win-set as well as what 
defines the Turkish win-set, both with a backdrop to the Cyprus conflict. Secondly 
we will look at how the powers and positions of the negotiators in the accession 
process and how they affect the win-sets in the negotiation situation. Then we move 
on to look at how the Cyprus conflict blocks a possible overlap in the win-sets and 
look at a few possible reasons why the conflict is not solved. Lastly we will look at 
which consequences the status quo has on the progression of the accession process 
and offer a theoretical approach to understanding how and why the negotiations 
have deadlocked through the theoretical scope of entrapment. 
We begin with the EU win-set: 
5.4.1 The EU Win-set 
The EU win-set in the Turkish accession negotiations is of a very limited size. First 
and foremost, this has to do with formal constraints: there are certain prerequisites 
that have to be accommodated before an acceding country can be accepted in the 
EU. There are two main prerequisites: the first one is the 80.000 pages acquis 
communautaire, which consists of all current legislation, legal acts, and court 
decisions under European Union law. The acquis communautaire is non-negotiable 
and it must be followed to the letter. The second main prerequisite is the 
Copenhagen Criteria. 
The Copenhagen Criteria are, to a certain extent, subject to negotiations and 
interpretation. This, however, does not guarantee leeway for Turkey. The EU has  
requested further reforms to ensure the Charter of Human Rights is being respected 
and fulfilled (European commission 2012), which means that the interpretation of 
the Copenhagen Criteria in the end lies with the EU. 
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In order to implement the acquis communautaire, Turkey must ensure the free 
movement of goods in all member states. This constitutes the most extensive 
dilemma for Turkey, as Turkey currently refuses to acknowledge the RC as a state 
and in extension refuses to apply the Additional Protocol to the RC. The EU has, 
because of this, chosen to suspend 8 out of the 35 chapters in the negotiation 
process, which thereby put the negotiations to a halt. This is currently the state of 
negotiations, within which the EU win-set, is being negotiated, internally between 
the member states. 
5.4.2 The Turkish Win-set 
Turkey is aware that they need to show positive intent towards the EU’s demands if 
they are to have chance at EU membership. Therefore they have a fairly large and 
flexible win-set. This is apparent as they have been executing extensive reforms 
during the last decade in order to fulfil the EU-demands. However, much to the 
frustration of Turkey, the EU continues to push for further reforms. In fact, the EU 
demands that Turkey has to live up to are far more extensive and stringent than 
those made to any other acceding EU state; this can e.g. be seen when comparing 
Turkey’s accession process to that of Romania and Bulgaria they acceded to the 
union in 2007, while still experiencing extensive problems with corruption and their 
respective economies (Hughes 2011: 2).  
 
So far Turkey has shown willingness and readiness to adapt, for the purpose of 
reaching the goal of full membership. The lenient attitude, under Erdogan, towards 
the EU indicates Turkey’s win-set is relatively large and has increased in size during 
the iterative process of negotiations between level I and II in Turkey. This 
development has however come to a halt as a result of the conflict between Turkey 
and the RC, in which the accession process has been stalled; EU member states and 
the EU have blocked some of the accession chapters. Turkey does not apply the 
Additional Protocol to Cyprus which means that Turkey has closed the airports and 
harbours to the RC. The failure to apply this protocol to all member states is a 
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breach of the accession benchmarks, which is viewed unacceptable by the EU; there 
is therefore no current overlap between the win-sets of the EU and Turkey. 
In order for them to reopen the negotiations, the conflict must be resolved. 
Resolving the conflict could rely on the efforts of the EU, by e.g. acceding Turkey on 
the basis that the conflict is easier solved if both conflicting parties are members; 
this is not plausible considering the political weight of the Brakemen outlined 
earlier. EU could also help by assisting the UN in an active conflict resolution 
between the two parties; but as highlighted earlier only the UK has an official 
unbiased attitude towards the conflict, while the rest of the outlined countries have 
the general position that Turkey must be the initiator of a solution. A more difficult 
approach could be that the RC and Turkey finds a way to resolve the conflict 
between them and to do so, the parties must give in to the demands from the 
countering part. As this is a situation that has been evolving for many decades, the 
prospect of a resolution between Turkey and the RC has difficult conditions. The 
decrease in the lenience in Turkey’s attitude towards EU’s reform demands could be 
viewed as demonstration of frustration in EU’s one-sidedness in the conflict. Turkey 
is not only expected to execute reforms according to the acquis communautaire but 
also expected to apply the Additional Protocol to all member states including the RC, 
in which the EU offers no help. On top of that Austria and France has proclaimed 
that even if a conflict was settled and an accession was evident, both countries 
would leave the decision up for referendum (Embassy of Austria 2010), which by 
their own opinion would not end in favour of Turkey.  
 
It is therefore vital for the future of the negotiations that the Cyprus conflict be 
treated in a constructive manner. In the current setting this is not possible due to 
the deadlock rooted in Turkey’s large win-set not overlapping with that of the EU. 
The negotiation is hence influenced by how state preferences change, in an 
interdependent relationship. This contributes to keeping the state of deadlock; 
when Turkey’s preferences, attitude and actions change for the worse, so does that 
of the EU.  
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5.4.3 Powers and positions of the negotiators 
In order to understand the realm of possible outcomes, the negotiators and their 
conferred powers are important to consider. This will be done in the following. 
Egemen Bağış, chief negotiator of Turkey, has very strong support at the level II 
negotiation table as his constituents have a very strong interest in reforming the 
country (MFA Turkey 2013). They also have a strong interest in the bargaining itself 
as EU membership for a long time has been a goal for Turkey. Turkey realises that 
reforms are necessary if they are to have a chance at EU membership. These factors 
enlarge the win-set because a wider range of level I agreements, can be ratified at 
level II. The EU negotiator, Štefan Füle, on the other hand, has very limited room for 
manoeuvring at his level II negotiation table as the structure of the ratification 
process is very complex and requires unanimous compliance from all the member 
states. Further, his constituents has proven sceptic towards the bargain itself, 
accessing the EU. These factors will decrease the size of the EU win-set as the range 
of outcomes that will be ratified at the EU level II will be narrowed. 
It can therefore be said that the EU uses their small win-set, to their own advantage 
by emphasising to Turkey that most of the demands are non-negotiable. There are 
sceptics within the member States, whom will block the negotiations if these do not 
comply with their respective preferences. The EU is therefore pressuring Turkey, to 
comply in order to achieve the long term goal, as a fully-fledged member. 
5.4.4 Rhetorical Entrapment 
Having looked at the size and content of the win-sets and how the Cyprus conflict 
influences these win-sets, we now move on to look at how the Cyprus conflict can 
have an effect on the benchmark agreements in Turkey’s accession process. 
Benchmark agreements are the agreements that Turkey already has committed 
itself to live up to, on its way to accession. This effect can be explained through the 
concept of rhetorical entrapment. This will further on be referred to as entrapment. 
Entrapment is the mechanism experienced when one party commits itself to an 
agreement which it may later regret, but due to the norms of international 
agreements,  are forced to assist and be open to further negotiations on the basis of 
such agreement (Schimmelfennig 2009: 429). When Turkey achieved candidate 
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status in the EU at the Helsinki summit, the EU made a commitment of acceding 
Turkey into the EU in the future. By 2005, when negotiations for full membership 
started, the member states committed themselves to the agreement. The Brakemen 
and the Drivers of the Turkish accession are therefore, by such standards, entrapped 
as they agreed to let Turkey become a candidate country when Turkey had fulfilled 
the requirements for becoming one. As long as Turkey plays by the EU rules, the EU 
is entrapped by this commitment. Entrapment can be reversed; this occurred when 
Turkey chose to place an embargo on goods from the RC. Turkey thereby failed to 
extend the principles of the Additional Protocol, the Customs Union, to include 
Cyprus (Ibid: 428). Hence Turkey broke the rules and norms surrounding the 
accession agreement, and they themselves became entrapped and subjected to 
sanctions, as the previously entrapped nations no longer were bound to follow the 
agreement when Turkey did not.  
 
The game can therefore continue to shift in power balance, accordingly with whom 
follows the conditions of the accession agreement. Who is and who is not entrapped 
will have considerable implications on Turkey’s possibilities of acceding to the EU. 
This is especially relevant in regards to the main Drivers in the negotiations; the UK, 
and Greece.  
In the current setting these are entrapped by the norms which they are obliged to 
follow, due to their EU membership. The UK has continued to be a Driver on behalf 
of Turkey in their bid for EU membership. However, since Turkey has breached the 
accession criteria by imposing the embargo on the RC, they have damaged their 
relations with the EU. They have breached with norms of an agreement which they 
hold with the EU and hence the UK. The UK is therefore in a state of entrapment; 
their preferences are for Turkey to accede to the EU, but they have limited 
possibilities to assist them in accomplishing such by the norms they are bound by, in 
extensions of their EU membership. The UK cannot condone the embargo on the RC. 
Hence Turkey has made a compromising move in this regard. As they have placed 
the UK in a state of entrapment, and has therefore singlehandedly damaged the 
chances of the negotiations evolving in a positive direction. 
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Through the concept of entrapment it can be seen that the Cyprus conflict is not the 
direct cause of the slow accession process when looking at the benchmark 
agreements. Here, the conflict has a more indirect influence as it has caused Turkey 
to breach an EU benchmark agreement and this breach is what has caused the 
stalling of the accession process.  
5.4.5 EU reluctance towards solving the Cyprus conflict 
We have outlined the win-sets of the negotiating parties and how the Cyprus conflict 
is blocking the possibility of a win-set overlap between the EU and Turkey, and how 
the conflict has a more indirect effect on existing agreements. It has further become 
clear that settling the conflict would be a great step towards Turkish membership. 
Below we will look into why EU is not pushing for the solving of the conflict, despite 
the importance of a solution. 
 
In regards to RC and how it has acted in Turkey’s accession process, it could be 
argued that the RC is purposively hindering a solution to the Cyprus conflict in order 
to prevent Turkey from acceding to the EU. In line with this, it is plausible that the 
EU has either actively or passively supported the deadlock that permeates the 
negotiations regarding the Cyprus conflict. It is possible that they are making, what 
is an act of voluntary defection, look like involuntary defection (Putnam 1988: 439). 
This means that they officially use the argument, that they cannot get a membership 
agreement with Turkey ratified due to internal differences between member states, 
when maybe in reality EU does not want Turkey to become a member, but has no 
way of renege from their promise to Turkey about future membership. This has 
given Turkey the impression that the EU might never commit to full membership 
(Taspinar 2013). Turkey might thus be waiting for the EU to show some proof that 
they are willing to commit, before they will make any further attempts at ending the 
conflict. This lack of confidence can be said to have reverberated in the Turkish 
society and resulted in emerging euroscepticism in the Turkish public.  
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The EU uses the obtainment of EU membership as a motivating factor for Turkey to 
resolve their conflict with the RC. The prospects for settling the Cyprus conflict in 
cooperation with the RC could therefore decrease if the Turkish public support for 
EU membership fades. This is not only dependent on the Turkish public support for 
EU, but also on the Turkish state preference towards becoming a member; if 
prospects of ever becoming a member decreases so that Turkey would look for 
another international partner the motivational aspect of solving the conflict will 
disappear. 
 
Depending on which factors are hindering a solution to the Cyprus conflict it will 
have an effect on the positions and potential bargaining powers of the negotiators 
and the possibility to create an overlap between the win-sets of the EU and Turkey. 
If the Turks are waiting for the EU to make a move, a solution has to be found within 
the EU member states, if the negotiations are to avoid a non-agreement outcome. If 
it is the Turkish population, or changing Turkish EU preferences, that are blocking 
reconciliation with RC, this might block a possible solution unless Erdogan is 
successful in reversing the euroscepticism that has been emerging. If it is a political 
power struggle between Turkey, and the RC, which has created a tense situation, in 
which none of the parties will budge, it will be very difficult to reach a solution. This 
will effectively block a solution with the EU, as Turkey’s accession is dependent on a 
solution to the Cyprus conflict, unless the EU has a change of heart on this matter. 
6. Conclusion 
 
On the basis of our initial work hypothesis:  
Cyprus is a hindrance to Turkey becoming a member of the European Union  
We have conducted our research which has enabled us to answer our problem 
formulation:  
How does the Cyprus conflict influence Turkey’s prospect of becoming a member of the 
EU? 
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In order to answer this question we had to look further into the state of affairs of the 
negotiations between EU, Turkey and Cyprus and the mechanics and interests that 
are in play in these. For the sake of understanding the current situation of the 
negotiations and the interest that governs them, we chose a broad empirical base in 
statistics, white papers, official documents and articles, books and journals. Using 
Liberal intergovernmentalism as our grand theory and Two-level game as 
framework for our analysis we then looked at how the state preferences interacted 
in the accession negotiations with backdrop to the Cyprus Conflict.  
Since its formal application for membership in 1987, Turkey has had a one way 
trajectory towards EU membership. This is evident by the numerous reforms 
executed by Turkey and the amendments added to the Turkish constitution. Even 
though euroscepticism has been rising in Turkey ever since chapters in the 
negotiation was blocked Turkey still considers a full membership as the end result 
of the negotiations. When the RC assumed the Presidency of the European Council in 
2012, Turkey blocked all communication with EU; this alongside not applying the 
Additional Protocol to the RC has been Turkey’s slip off the trajectory towards 
membership. Not applying the protocol to Cyprus is not an act which is directly 
linked to the conflict; Turkey does not want to apply the protocol before external 
trade sanctions towards the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) has been 
lifted, and these sanctions are a direct result of the conflict.  
 
The official EU argument for Turkey still not being a member is the issue of the 
Additional Protocol along with further advancement regarding alignment with the 
accession criteria. Hence according to the EU the Cyprus Conflict is not what is 
stopping Turkey’s accession. However when glancing at the EU domestic level, the 
explanation for Turkey’s slow accession process is not so clear cut as it would 
appear from official EU statements.  
The accession process is built around unanimous voting which means that the 
process is greatly influenced and decided by individual state preferences. When 
looking at state preferences it is evident that it is the state’s attitude towards 
Turkey’s EU-membership, and not towards the conflict itself, that decides whether 
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the state will act as a brakeman, and thereby stalling the accession process, or as a 
driver, by pushing forward the process. An exception to this is of course the 
Republic of Cyprus as it is a part of the conflict. Whereas other EU states are using 
the conflict to further their agenda in the question of Turkish accession, Cyprus, on 
the other hand, is using the deadlock in the accession negotiations to further their 
own position in the conflict. Cyprus has, as it seems, chosen to invoke EU measures 
to pursue their national interests by blocking the opening of several negotiating 
chapters to keep Turkey out of the EU. With Turkey on the outside Cyprus has 
secured EU support in the conflict. Thus, the Cyprus conflict is a vital piece in the 
political puzzle for Turkey’s accession. 
The EU has so far not participated noteworthy in solving the Conflict even though 
they have required a solution to the crisis. It can therefore be argued that since the 
EU is not actively solving the conflict, which is essentially blocking the accession 
process, the EU could be trying to defect voluntarily making it look as involuntary 
defection.  
 
The reluctance of the EU to advance the negotiations with Turkey can further be 
explained by the state of entrapment. When Turkey in 2006 had still not lifted the 
trade embargo on the RC the negotiators of the Turkish accession found themselves 
entrapped, and the negotiations deadlocked. This therefore stresses the importance 
of the defined norms of negotiations, and that such must be followed in order for 
negotiations to be successful. This proves how fragile such negotiations are, as one 
misstep by Turkey may lead to entrapment in favor of the Brakemen and thereby 
deadlock.  
 
On this basis and as answer to our problem formulation of how the Cyprus 
influences Turkey’s prospect of becoming a member of the EU, the conclusion of the 
project is thus;  
That the Cyprus conflict is a serious impediment for Turkish EU-membership. We 
have though also found that it is not the Cyprus conflict alone or directly which is a 
hindrance to Turkey’s accession. It is just as much the political acts e.g. the failure to 
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implement the additional protocol and the block of accession chapters, which the 
conflict has fostered that is a hindrance to Turkey’s accession. 
7. Afterthoughts 
 
As discussed throughout the project, the problems surrounding Turkey’s possible 
EU membership are many and varied. The range of such is wide, spanning from 
human rights issues to interstate conflict to the economic structures of society. 
There are therefore some complications which have been subjected to less attention 
throughout the project. These will be discussed below. 
 
First and foremost, is the effect of the financial crisis on the EU-Turkey relations and 
in extension Turkey’s possibilities to become an EU-member. Right after the 
outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008 the EU would most likely have changed their 
focus from enlargement of the EU to solving the financial crisis and exercise damage 
control within the Eurozone. 
This may have stalled the accession process, as the diplomatic forces would rather 
be used on economic policy issues than to e.g. mediate between Turkey and the RC. 
 
The financial crisis did have an impact on the Turkish economy, but contrary to the 
Eurozone, Turkish economy bounced back and is currently experiencing positive 
growth. It can therefore be expected that the preferences of the EU will change 
accordingly, as Turkey’s economy and growth can prove to be an asset to the EU. 
The roles have changed slightly as the EU now has a rather low growth rate, and 
Turkish economy is developing at a much faster pace. From 2003 to 2012 Turkey 
has experienced an average annual growth rate of 5.10%, where the EU as a whole 
has had an annual growth rate of 1.20 % in average. 
 
Furthermore, the massive impact that Turkey will have on the EU budget if accepted 
should be taken into account. It can be expected that Turkey will benefit a lot from 
the CAP, and this will be a large expenditure for the EU. Even though Turkey is 
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experiencing growth it should be noted that they are not a wealthy country. In 2011 
Turkey had a GDP per head of 17034 USD. In comparison, Germany’s GDP per head 
was 39465 USD and France’s was 35505 USD (OECD 2013). Turkey is far behind 
Germany, the EU member state, which they are closest to in compared relative 
population size. The question of whether the EU has the ability to absorb a country 
of Turkey’s size is therefore relevant and one of the criteria that especially Austria 
has voiced (Embassy of Austria 2010) but is also within the rhetoric of other 
member states. 
 
The enlargement process of other European nations may help pave the way for 
Turkey to become a member. This may especially be evident in the accession of 
Croatia. As stated before, Austria has previously argued that Turkey should not 
become a member as long as Croatia is not. Croatia will accede to the union on the 
1st of July 2013 (Judah 2013). This could lead to a more positive agenda towards 
including Turkey.  
 
If the EU chooses not to include Turkey, there will be other alternatives to choose 
from. They will be able to turn east and focus their attention on relations with Asia, 
which they are already doing, as Turkey has become a dialogue partner with 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). It is though important to stress that the 
SCO is not an Asian equivalent to the EU although Turkey could be a part of the 
Russian/Chinese strategy; to become an international weighted voice. This also 
means that if the EU stalls the accession for too long and the Turkish EU-interest 
decreases, Turkey might be in a very favourable negotiating position as the EU 
would possibly want to diminish the Russian/Chinese influence in EU’s backyard.  
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